This paper evaluates a burgeoning literature on the effects of the 1996 welfare reform bill. Our goal is to shift the debate from the current preoccupation with declining caseloads to one focused on the social and economic well-being of fragile families, single mothers, and children. The welfare literature reveals many positive changes: reduced poverty rates, lower outof-wedlock childbearing, greater family stability, and little indication of more spouse abuse or child neglect. But it is too early to claim success and many questions remain unanswered.
INTRODUCTION
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 ended America's largest cash assistance program --Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Its replacement, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), emphasizes work, personal responsibility, economic self-sufficiency, and strong families. The "end of welfare as we know it" means that low-income single mothers can no longer receive cash aid indefinitely; the federal legislation places strict time limits on welfare receipt --two years without working and five years over a lifetime. Indeed, welfare receipt comes with the obligation to work or face sanctions, including being removed from the welfare rolls.
PRWORA continues to be a highly contentious topic. Many sociologists believed its passage would be a legislative calamity -that it would lead to more poverty and that lowincome women and their children would suffer new material hardships (Harris 1996; Sandefur 1996) . A widely-cited study by the Urban Institute projected that welfare reform would doom one million additional children to poverty (Zedlewski et al 1996) . To critics, the bill scapegoated or blamed low-income women for their circumstances (Rose 2000; Eitzen & Baca Zinn 2000) .
The welfare reform bill was at once paternalistic and punitive. It ignored or downplayed larger economic forces that have adversely affected the economic stability of low-income single-parent families with children. Indeed, it failed to acknowledge the root causes of poverty, such as economic and social injustice, racial discrimination, and a bifurcating economy that favored the affluent over the poor (O'Connor 2000) .
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The purpose of this paper is to synthesize a burgeoning new literature on the consequences of welfare reform. Since PRWORA was passed, the early grim forecasts have not materialized. Indeed, the evidence to date has exceeded expectations of even the most optimistic supporters and has silenced critics. Welfare rolls have plummeted by more than 50% nationally since its peak in 1994. TANF surpluses have been put to other uses, including child care subsidies, transportation, and training programs. The official poverty rate of 36% among femaleheaded families with children (in 2000) , although still high, is the lowest on record, while children have experienced falling poverty rates since the mid-1990s (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001a). Poverty declines are even greater if the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is taken into account (Ellwood 2000a ).
Our goal is straightforward: to shift the focus from welfare caseloads to other less visible and easily measured social outcomes. We balance the current preoccupation with caseload declines with a broader discussion of whether welfare reform has achieved "success" or not in other important public policy domains. Specifically, we evaluate an emerging welfare literature focused on material deprivation and poverty, fertility and family formation (e.g., out-of-wedlock childbearing), marriage and cohabitation, maternal well-being (e.g., mental health), and child development. We also evaluate the question of whether welfare reform has led to more geographic balkanization among low-income families.
The 107th Congress began the debate over PRWORA re-authorization in Fall 2001 and new welfare legislation goes into effect in 2002 (Haskins & Blank 2001) . It is time to ask: Has welfare reform helped or hurt the poor? What do we know and what to we need to know? How do we measure success?
Declining Caseloads
PRWORA sought to end dependence on government handouts. Between August 1996 and June 2000, the number of recipients plunged by 6.5 million, or 53%. Caseloads are lower today (roughly 5.8 million persons) than any time since 1969, and the percentage of persons receiving public assistance income (less than 3%) is the lowest on record (Depart. of Health & Human Services 2001a) . Such diverse states as Wisconsin, Idaho, and Mississippi have experienced caseload reductions of 80% or more since 1993. The magnitude of such decline, experienced broadly across the American states, has been nothing short of remarkable. Alone, however, caseloads are an incomplete indicator of success, which ultimately will be measured by the improved well-being of America's poor families and children.
To be sure, welfare reform happened at a propitious time, when unemployment rates were at their lowest level in decades (i.e., less than 4%) and job growth was unparalleled. The question is clear: Is the decline in caseloads mostly due to the new welfare reform legislation or to a robust economy? A recent study of welfare waivers prior to PRWORA found that the 1993-96 declines in AFDC caseloads were largely attributable to changing economic conditions (Ziliak et al 2000) . Nationwide, roughly two-thirds of the decline was due to the macroeconomy.
Whether these conclusions apply to the post-1996 period is open to debate. The Council of Economic Advisors claims that roughly one-third of the caseload decline between 1996 and 1998 was attributable to TANF, while only 8-10% was due to the economy (U.S. Council of Economic Advisors 1999). Others suggest that the waiver process produced a "threat effect" that caused welfare recipients to act (positively) in anticipation of the changes in welfare eligibility, such as investing more in their own schooling or job skills, or finding a job. A declining caseload also 7 freed up TANF block grant monies for other innovative programs that built on its success (Blank 2001; Rogers-Dillon 2001) .
The recent economic downturn and the rise in unemployment may foreshadow an unhappy future for low-income women and their children. Yet, welfare reform also may have helped many low-income women gain a foothold in the labor force and improved their ability to weather a job layoff. The final test of the effects of welfare policy versus the macroeconomy may not come until a full-fledged recession occurs. In the end, such distinctions are artificial.
An expanding economy was surely necessary to absorb welfare leavers, but it also is unlikely that a similarly large percentage of welfare recipients would have sought employment in the absence of welfare reform. Recent expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and child care subsidies also have provided work incentives and supports that have operated independently of either welfare reform or a robust economy.
Welfare Composition: More Hard-to-Serve Cases?
Who are the "hard to serve" cases -those left behind in the new economy and illprepared for TANF's tough work requirements? As lifetime welfare eligibility is exhausted, sanctioned leavers may be harder to serve than earlier leavers (Tweedie 2002) . New TANF enrollees also may be different from past recipients. State "diversion" programs provide lowincome persons short-term cash or housing assistance while discouraging enrollment in TANF . Only the truly needy, as a last resort, may now be receiving monthly cash assistance through TANF.
Recent changes may suggest a more disadvantaged caseload today than in the past (US Dept. of Health & Human Services 2001b) . Hispanics increased from 17 to 25% of all caseloads 8 between 1990 and 1999, while Blacks were over-represented among recipients (38% in 1999) by roughly a factor of three. Average age of recipient adults also increased from 29.7 to 31.8 over this period, while those without young children declined from 30 to 21% (US Dept. of Health & Human Services 2001b) . Current welfare recipients may be longer-term recipients, with more intractable problems (i.e., few skills or inadequate child-care). A longitudinal study of welfare recipients in Michigan found that non-working women on welfare are less likely to have a high school degree, have fewer job skills, and have more physical and mental health problems than employed recipients (Danziger 2001) . On the other hand, Moffitt & Stevens (2001) and Smith (2001) found little evidence that leavers are selective of the most skilled.
Another approach is to compare the early TANF leavers with the later leavers, those with presumably fewer job skills or with personal circumstances that prevent success. For example, after exhausting eligibility, low-income mothers must necessarily adopt new survival strategies, including marriage or cohabitation, doubling up in other households, and work. Indeed, the National Survey of American Families reveals that recent TANF leavers have worse physical and mental health than early leavers, and more worries about food and paying rent and utility bills (Loprest 2001) . But, paradoxically, they also are less likely to be poor. Zedlewski & Alderson (2001) also found few caseload differences between 1997 and 1999 in the distribution of new entrants, leavers, and cyclers (on and off welfare). Welfare mothers are no more likely than in the past to be long term recipients --those women who typically have low education, few job skills, and multiple barriers to employment.
BEYOND CASELOADS

Work, Earnings, and Poverty
An overriding goal of PRWORA is to promote economic self-sufficiency through work (Ellwood 2000a; Pavetti & Wemmerus 1999) . Between 1994 and 2000, for example, the percentage of unmarried mothers who were employed grew 11.6 percentage points to 78.9%. The policy implication is clear: The working poor now constitute a greater share of all poor people. Family income among the poor has been "repackaged," while remaining low and unchanged. Indeed, the top 1% of the population enjoyed a 40% (or $194,000) increase in average income, while the bottom fifth gained only 1% (Shapiro et al 2001) .
Unmarried women with children became employed at unprecedented levels in the late 1990s -at rates higher than their married counterparts (Danziger 1999; Cancian et al 1999) . A growing economy has absorbed the large influx of former welfare recipients, apparently without displacing other marginal workers or driving down wage rates (Burtless 1998) . In fact, the percentage of all employed women with poverty wage rates actually declined during 1995-2000, from 36.8 to 31.1% (Mishel et al 2001) ; it dipped from 29.7 to 25.0% for all workers. The income-to-needs ratio of all female heads increased slightly after 1996, while the income-topoverty ratio for poor female heads was .50 throughout the 1990s (Lichter & Jensen 2001 ).
Other studies, however, indicate that disposable income (including earnings, food stamps, EITC) of the poorest poor declined, at least during the first few years of PRWORA (Primus et al 1999) . them and their poor preparation for the labor market, many low-skilled former TANF recipients find jobs that pay poorly and that do not last . Data from the National Survey of American Families indicate that 60% of those who went off welfare were working (Loprest 1999) . About 20% of leavers report no income whatsoever; they make ends meet in the underground economy, by babysitting, or by receiving assistance from boyfriends and relatives.
Some may have married. Also, employment rates and earning are lower among the least skilled and educated and among sanctioned leavers --those forced off of welfare because they failed to seek or find work. Haskins & colleagues (2001a) claim that 20% of former TANF recipients are unable to hold a job and often recycle back onto welfare.
Although poverty rates have fallen among single mothers, critics rightly worry that the official poverty measure distorts levels of material hardship and no longer accurately tracks the economic circumstances of poor people (Citro & Michael 1995; Lichter 1997; Bernstein et al 2001) . Income poverty thresholds may be unrealistically low, and family survival strategies, such as doubling up with relatives or moving in with boyfriends, may nominally reduce poverty (as currently measured) but misrepresent serious economic problems. The official poverty rate does not adjust for geographic cost-of-living differentials or in-kind benefits, ignores wealth and other financial assets, and underestimates alternative sources of cash income (including off-thebook income and income from live-in boyfriends or relatives) while distorting family consumption patterns (Iceland & Kim 2001; Short et al 1999) .
To date, however, alternative measures of poverty tell a no less optimistic story of declining economic deprivation among low-income women (Haskins & Primus 2001 ).
Ethnographic studies indicate that single mothers often spend more income than they report, implying that income by source is misreported (Edin & Lein 1997) . Meyer & Sullivan (2001) address this issue by examining consumption levels --pre-and post-PRWORA --using the Consumer Expenditure Survey. They found that total consumption was higher for single mothers in 1996-98 than in earlier periods. More significantly, consumption at the 25 th percentile of income (i.e., the near-poor) also was higher than during the 1984-90 period. Consumption increased no more slowly among single mothers than among either single childless women or married women.
Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing and Female-headed Families
Public attitudes and discourse about welfare reform are often formed by a singularly negative image: single mothers with one or more children --idle, poor, disproportionately minority, and living off government handouts. In the debate proceeding passage of PRWORA, some argued that unwed childbearing is "the most important social issue of our time" (Murray 1993) , and that "the fastest ticket to poverty is to have a child out of wedlock" (Shaw 1996) .
Welfare hurt rather than helped low-income women (Murray 1984) . It created disincentives to work and equally unwelcome incentives to bear children out-of-wedlock, reinforcing the economically disadvantaged circumstances of low-income women. Indeed, Rosenzweig (1999) found that a 10% increase in state AFDC benefit levels was associated with a 12% greater likelihood of unwed childbearing among poor women (cf. Moffitt 1998). For some groups, poverty and welfare dependency became "a way of life," inculcated during childhood, and passed on from generation to generation through a variety of adaptive and maladaptive behaviors, including unwed childbearing (see Gottschalk 1996) .
In the end, PRWORA aimed to "prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies" and to "encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families" (P.L. educated than among other groups. We cannot unambiguously declare that reductions in unwed childbearing are due to TANF (or, for that matter, to a strong economy), but the largely unanticipated turnaround in many key family indicators is a welcome development.
104-193, section 401(a)). Scholars hold widely differing views about whether AFDC
14 To make stronger claims of success, we must evaluate several specific welfare reform provisions aimed at reducing unwed childbearing. For example, PRWORA provides cash bonuses to states with the largest reductions in unwed childbearing without experiencing more abortions. The first "illegitimacy bonuses," totaling 20 million per state, were awarded in 1999
to Alabama, California, The District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and Michigan. An Allan
Guttmacher survey in 1998 indicated that 34 states and the District of Columbia took specific steps to win the bonus. But identifying specific winning strategies has thus far proven elusive and the lessons learned are modest (Haskins et al 2001a) .
States also are required to eliminate cash benefits to unwed teens under age 18 who do not reside with their parents. Studies have shown that state welfare benefit levels are associated with the growth of female-headed families with children (Ellwood & Bane 1985; Moffitt 1998) .
PRWORA sought to remove incentives to leave home through unwed childbearing. Although it is unclear whether this provision has affected unwed childbearing, the growth in "child only"
welfare recipients (i.e., those not living with parents) is troubling. Rather than relinquish independent living, teen mothers may now be more likely to give custody of their children to relatives or nonrelatives. Unlike the new welfare regime, AFDC kept mothers and their children together, for good or ill (Brandon 2000; Hu 2001 ).
PRWORA also allowed family caps on the receipt of additional cash benefits from unwed childbearing. To date, however, quasi-experimental data have revealed either modest or no effects on unwed childbearing for the 21 states choosing this option. Birth rates among mothers receiving welfare income are very low --much lower than among all unmarried women --and any marginal effect from small dollars lost to mothers is not easily revealed statistically.
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A heavily-criticized New Jersey study found that welfare mothers subjected to the family cap had slightly lower birth rates than other mothers still enrolled in AFDC (cf., Camasso et al 1998; Murray 2001) . In a comprehensive cross-state comparison, Horvath- Rose & Peters (2002) studied nonmarital birth ratios in states with and without family cap waivers over the [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] period, finding that family caps reduced nonmarital birth ratios. The behavioral mechanisms (e.g., abstinence or diligent contraception) that produced such effects, however, are largely unknown (Argys et al 2000) . Any fears that family caps would lead to more abortions is allayed by declining numbers and rates of abortion (Henshaw 2001) . Claiming success of family caps is premature, however. Whether newly-born or previously-born "capped" children suffer developmental consequences is unknown.
Title III of PRWORA also promotes male responsibility by establishing legal paternity for births to unmarried women and by writing more child support orders that benefit single mothers . Tougher child support enforcement make men accountable for their sexual behavior and for children born outside of marriage. Unfortunately, only a handful of studies have systemically examined the impact of these policies or identified specific successful administrative programs, especially for teens (see . The early evidence, however, is encouraging. Lichter & Jensen (2001) showed increases in the percentage of poor single mothers receiving child support, and Garfinkel et al (2001) found that strict child support laws reduced unwed childbearing. Horvath- Rose & Peters (2002) similarly found that paternity establishment was significantly associated with lower nonmarital fertility ratios in states that adopted such waivers over 1987-1996. In the final analyses, the passage of PRWORA has coincided with declines in unwed childbearing and modest reductions in the share of children living with single mothers. Whether the turnaround in many key family indicators is both permanent and a direct consequence of specific provisions of PRWORA is to early to tell.
Marriage, Cohabitation, and Divorce
Marriage is described in the 1996 welfare bill as the "foundation of a successful society"
and as an "essential institution… that promotes the interests of children." With re-authorization, The logic of marriage promotion activities is straightforward: married women have lower poverty rates than single mothers (Besharov & Sullivan 1996) . Welfare benefit restrictions (including time limits) also have "unambiguous implications for marriage, as single mothers confronted with a significant income cut have a clear incentive to marry to secure alternative financial support" (Fein 1999:4) . In addition, many marriage proponents are less interested in creating new incentives than in removing unintended financial disincentives to marry or stay married (cf., Horn & Sawhill 2001; Ellwood 2000b) . A few programs, for example, have experimented with eliminating marriage eligibility restrictions on TANF enrollees. The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) has received the most attention.
By making two-parent families eligible for public assistance, MFIP participation modestly increased marriage and decreased family instability (Knox et al 2000) . Other studies show that the EITC creates a "work bonus" for low-income single working women (Ellwood 2000b ), but that getting married exacts a financial cost, often a severe one (Steurle 1997). Ellwood (2000b) showed that EITC penalties from marriage outnumbered those receiving rewards. Couples that had a child after they married, however, were more likely to benefit from EITC. The EITC created a financial incentive for nonworking single mothers to marry (i.e., she would reap the EITC benefits of her working husband), but also encouraged working single mothers to cohabit rather than marry.
Other studies have produced only modest or inconsistent evidence that marital and cohabitation decisions are influenced by welfare benefits and anti-poverty policies . For example, in an analyses of annual data from the Current Population Survey, Blau et al (1999) found that welfare benefit levels were negatively associated with marriage and positively related to female headship, but that these associations disappeared when state fixed effects were controlled. Lichter et al. (1997) reported similarly modest family incentive effects of welfare. Moreover, Blackburn (2000) found little relationship between state welfare payment levels and marriage among non-Blacks. Benefit levels were associated with unexpectedly higher marriage rates among Blacks.
The incentive effects of AFDC and TANF on marriage have rarely been compared. An exception is Schoeni & Blank (2001) . They found that pre-1996 welfare waivers were associated with modest increases in probabilities of marriage and a reduction in household Clearly, we cannot make unambiguous claims that welfare reform has fundamentally altered marital decision making among the low-income and welfare-dependent population without additional research (Lichter & Graefe 2001) . Whether newly-initiated marriage promotion activities under TANF will reinvigorate marriage, reduce poverty, and benefit children are empirical questions.
Well-Being of Single Mothers
The tough work requirements and time limits of TANF raise serious concerns about the coping strategies of low-income welfare-dependent women. Welfare reform may have created new stressors that are counterproductive in the longer run. For example, has TANF adversely affected mental health, contributed to more substance abuse, and undermined effective parenting, steady employment, and strong families? Time limits on eligibility may encourage some women, unable to adequately support themselves, to enter or stay in unhealthy or abusive relationships (Riger & Krieglstein 2000) . Indeed, welfare mothers face disproportionately high rates of physical abuse, which takes an emotional toll, and male partners often sabotage or discourage women's efforts for economic independence through TANF (Lyon 2001) . in a New York Times op-ed that "all the financial lures and prods and all the job training in the world will do precious little to make employable the hundreds of thousands of welfare recipients who are addicts and abusers" (Califano 1995: 40) . Differences in what constitutes use and abuse have produced prevalence estimates that vary widely, from 7 to 27% (Olson & Pavetti, 1996) .
One study estimated that 21% of welfare recipients, compared to 13% of single mothers not 20 receiving welfare, used an illegal substance in the past year; marijuana use was the most common . National studies indicate that drug use is more common among welfare recipients than non-recipient comparison groups (Olson & Pavetti 1996 (Pollack et al 2001) . Whether drug testing has paid dividends in reduced drug use among welfare mothers is unclear.
Although no less important, mental health has received somewhat less policy attention . One recent study indicated that 42% of welfare mothers exhibited high indicates that 20% of welfare women experienced psychiatric disorders within the past year . The NHSDA, however, includes information on only four disorders: major depression, anxiety disorders, panic attacks, and agoraphobia. The National Comorbidity Survey (NCS), which contains information on over 10 psychiatric diagnoses, indicates that almost 40% of single mothers had experienced a psychiatric disorder in the past year.
The unresolved question is: Are psychiatric problems a cause or consequence of poverty and welfare dependence? And does maternal work improve low-income women's mental health? The fact that many poor, single mothers have experienced rape, domestic violence, and sexual molestation seemingly implicates the debilitating personal circumstances of many hardto-serve welfare or low-income mothers. Indeed, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is missing from the NHSDA, but is disproportionately experienced by welfare recipients. Among participants in a welfare-to-work program in New Jersey, 22% reported having been raped; 55%
had experienced domestic violence; and 20% had been sexually molested as a child (Curcio 1996) . NCS results indicate that 14% of single mothers had experienced PTSD in the previous year and 15% of welfare recipients in a Michigan sample were suffering from PTSD .
Unfortunately, these women often have difficulty making the transition from welfare to work and achieving self-sufficiency (Jayakody & Stauffer 2000) . Many welfare mothers must shoulder the emotional burden of caring for children with physical or psychological disabilitiesa situation which some estimates suggest may be faced by up to 40% or more of poor families.
Psychiatric problems are associated with a higher probability going on and staying on welfare . Recent results from the Women's Employment Study, a longitudinal survey of welfare recipients in Michigan, indicated that women on welfare, but not working, are more likely to have mental health and other problems than former welfare recipients now working (Pollack et al 2001; Danziger 2001) . Mental health problems also place women at risk of sanctioning, due to non-compliance with work requirements and other TANF regulations.
Clearly, mental health problems and substance abuse threaten healthy family functioning and undermine the long-term (often numerical employment) goals of TANF (Zurivan & Grief 1989) . For children, the implications for psychosocial development also are potentially large, but are often overlooked in debates over welfare-to-work programs.
Child Well-Being
Indeed, proponents of work-based welfare argue that encouraging maternal employment will, on balance, enhance children's cognitive and emotional development (see Hofferth et al 2000; Zaslow et al 1999) . A working mother provides a positive role model for her children.
Through regular employment, she may instill values in her children that emphasize work over welfare. Steady employment also "routinizes" daily life and gives children needed structure to their lives. By working, mothers also enhance their own mental health, self esteem, and sense of personal self-efficacy. In turn, they become better parents, more effective in supervising their children and meting out appropriate discipline as needed. High-quality child care and afterschool programs may also have positive benefits for low-income children.
The opposing view is that working at low pay creates additional stress on mothers, reduces the time -especially quality time -spent with children, and diverts income to workrelated expenses, such as transportation and child care. Early on, critics worried that welfare reform would lead to more cases of child abuse and neglect, fosterage, and abandonment.
Effective parenting and supervision (e.g., making sure their children meet immunization and school attendance standards) may be undermined. Some needy single mothers, unable to cope, would be forced to "give up" parenting altogether, turning over this responsibility to grandparents or other relatives. If mothers are unable to find work and are sanctioned -forced off of welfare -the loss of income also may adversely affect children's psychosocial development (Klebanov et al 1994; Morris et al 2001) .
It is too early tell which view is correct. In an evaluation of a set of welfare-reform These findings contrast with results from a study in Delaware, which randomly assigned 3,959 single parent families to A Better Chance (ABC) program, which included strong work requirements, time limits, and parenting and other personal responsibility requirements, while the others remained on AFDC (Fein & Lee 2000) . ABC participation was associated with slightly evaluated risks of child neglect, but overall impacts on physical, emotional abuse, or sexual abuse, or on foster care placements were insignificant. However, the most disadvantaged children -those with parents having low education, long-term recipients, and minorities -fared worse than the comparison group. A Illinois study found that neglect and "risk of harm" were roughly 1.8 times greater in sanctioned families than in those not sanctioned (Shook 1998 ).
Whether sanctions "caused" greater neglect or sanctioned mothers had multiple problems that affected their children could not be discerned from the study design. . Whether increases are due to the waiver process or to specific TANF provisions is unclear. The economic and developmental implications for children, however, are unambiguous. Over 60% of children living alone with a grandmother were poor, and 90% received public assistance (Bryson & Casper 1999) . In a national study, Ehrle et al (2001) reported that living with relatives placed disadvantaged children at risk --22% experienced three or more risks, compared with 8% among all U.S. children. The implications of the counterfactual --if these same children had remained with their parents --is unknowable.
Indeed, moving in with a grandmother is often associated with family crisis --a parent with 26 serious emotional problems, substance abuse, imprisonment, or family violence (Pruchno 1999; Fuller-Thomson et al 1997) .
WELFARE REFORM AND SPATIAL INEQUALITY
Race to the Bottom?
Critics of PRWORA also have been concerned that some states, in an effort to save money and fearing that generous welfare benefits would attract low-income migrants, may cut spending and tighten eligibility on welfare and work support programs. A "race to the bottom" among competing states would usher in new material hardship for low-income people (Schram & Beer 1999; Weir 1999) . The alternative view is that the "devolution revolution," by giving states flexibility to design and implement their own welfare programs, would reinforce existing spatial economic inequalities. Progressive states --those with comparatively generous TANF benefits and programs --would distance themselves from poorer states lacking a history of support for welfare.
Indeed, while the average monthly TANF benefit in FY 1998 was $358, this figure masks substantial state-to-state differences in welfare generosity. The average benefit was only $101
in Mississippi and $136 in Alabama, but $497 in California and $462 in Connecticut (http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/opre/characteristics/fy98/tab09_98.htm). These differences are muted, to some extent, by eligibility for more food stamps in the least generous states. To date, however, there is little evidence to support either scenario ---that states are degrading their welfare systems through TANF or that rich and poor states have become more polarized.
Unexpectedly large and sweeping declines in caseloads have eased budgetary pressure to cut 27 welfare spending and "maintenance of effort" provisions in PRWORA mandating that welfare spending cannot be less than 80% of 1994 levels.
The "race to the bottom" never really started (Bruekner 2000) . 
States as welfare magnets
The passage of PRWORA has also reinvigorated concerns that welfare-generous states (like New York or Wisconsin or Massachusetts) would become "welfare magnets" that attract low-income and welfare-dependent in-migrants from less generous states (Corbett 1991 Enchautegui (1997) found that migrants responded positively to benefit differences between sending and receiving states, while the multi-method approach used by Meyer (2000) showed modest welfare-induced migration. Levine & Zimmerman (1999) , however, provided no support for the view that the welfareeligible population was responsive to state variation in welfare benefit levels. In general, migration flows of the poor (from the NLSY) paralleled those of the non-poor. But this conclusion may not apply to all population subgroups. For example, immigrant welfare recipients are more heavily clustered in high-benefit states than are other natives or immigrants.
Income-maximizing immigrants, once the decision is made to move to the United States, have fewer marginal costs than natives associated with which state to choose as a destination (Borjas 1999) . Immigrants may therefore be especially sensitive to welfare policy changes. Delta showed only one job available for every two welfare recipients (Howell 1997) , while rural labor markets nationally may be unable to accommodate a large influx of unmarried mothers (Jensen & Chitose 1997 ).
The implication is that PRWORA may have exacerbated longstanding economic problems among low-income single mothers in rural areas ( More recently, Lichter & Jensen (2001) showed that trends in employment, earnings, and poverty among single mothers have largely mirrored metropolitan patterns over the past decade.
Welfare reform has similarly affected employment rates among single mothers in nonmetro and metro areas (McKernan et al 2001) . Like metropolitan single mothers, rural women became less dependent on public assistance income and food stamps since 1996, and more dependent on earnings from work (Lichter & Jensen 2001) . The ameliorative effects of public assistance on 30 poverty (i.e., the percentage lifted above poverty income thresholds), however, decreased by 36% since 1996 in rural areas.
For rural America, the problem is working poverty. Indeed, rural workers have suffered disproportionately high rates of poverty and this problem has grown since welfare reform legislation was passed. Today, over one-third of working rural female heads are poor, a figure higher than any time since 1989 (Lichter & Jensen 2001) . Clearly, optimistic statements based on national economic indicators mask the situation in many parts of rural America.
CONCLUSIONS
Welfare reform has, in combination with a good economy, ushered in many positive changes. Welfare caseloads, poverty and maternal employment, and several key family and child indicators (e.g., unwed childbearing) have moved in positive directions since PRWORA was signed into law. And, equally important, there is little evidence that the early fears of growing child poverty, spouse abuse, or child neglect have become more commonplace. The
American public and policy makers also have a less malevolent view of "hard to serve" mothers and children who remain on welfare. Welfare receipt has become much less stereotypical (i.e., fewer references to the "welfare queen") and fewer attributions are given to individual failings.
As such, there may be greater willingness to help low-income mothers who "play by the rules" by working and behaving responsibly.
The lack of longitudinal or panel data on families and children -both before and after PRWORA --prevents a full assessment of potential consequences of welfare policy. We do not yet understand the short-and long-term consequences for women and children who have 31 exhausted their TANF eligibility or been sanctioned. We know little about the circumstances of families who have been denied TANF benefits through state diversion programs. The working poor are growing segment of America's low-income population, but we do not know whether work -even at low pay -translates into positive outcomes in the longer term (e.g., better maternal mental health, satisfying and stable marriages, or positive role modeling for children) or leads to additional suffering. Indeed, we do not know whether TAFN will ultimately attenuate the intergenerational transmission of poverty and welfare dependence by promoting work values and traditional families as a context for childbearing and child rearing. We do not now whether tough work requirements and time limits will encourage single women to marry or cohabit unwisely or to give up custody of their children. More important, we do not know whether increased exposure to alternative care givers will help or hurt children of low-income working mothers. Although the preliminary evidence is generally positive, we cannot yet discern whether more generous work and income supports have translated into healthier outcomes among poor children, now and when they grow into adulthood.
In the end, the usual caveat applies: welfare reform has made many low-income families less dependent on government and more self-sufficient. But it also has undoubtedly hurt others.
And we do not know whether TANF has promoted personal responsibility or stronger families, as envisioned by its early proponents. As such, sociologists have a large and unprecedented policy role to play during the next phase of welfare reform, after reauthorization of PRWORA and when the welfare debate shifts from declining caseloads to promoting healthy families and children. To be sure, policy research has its limitations, including its potential for political bias and its penchant for misplaced policy assumptions (e.g., "culture of poverty"). But our admonition to engage in research-based policy research and solutions reflects our positive view of the sociological perspective -one focused on inter-related family and economic systems, structural constraints and opportunities, and changing cultural values.
Indeed, at least three major data collection efforts promise new insights about welfare reform and family functioning. The Fragile Families and Child Well-being Study follows a birth cohort of (mostly) unwed parents and their children over a four-year period, and, among other things, provide information on welfare policy effects on family formation, stability, and child Welfare reform is here to stay. It has not been the unmitigated disaster first imagined by its critics, and the declining caseloads now provide a strong political base for more welfare experimentation. But it is much too early for policy makers and the social science research community to become complacent or to claim success. The complete story of welfare reform -
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PRWORA and beyond --has not yet been told. 
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